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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
"~HIT~IORE OXYGE~ CO~IP ANY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-YS.-

~TATE

TAX CO~I~IISSION OF
STATE OF UTAH and
GRA~T A. BRO\YX. ELISHA
WARNER, :MILTON TWITCHELL and ROSCOE E. HA1f:JIOXD, as the duly appointed and
THE

CASE
NO. 7154

acting commissioners thereof,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter reaches this court h:' writ of certiorari
from the State Tax Commission. The controversy in'\'olves a Use Tax a:;;sPssment by the State Tax Commission, and the case \Y8!S submitted to the commission
upon an agreed statement of fact~ (Tr. 34-39) whirh,
Jn·ipfl)' ~ummarized, are as follovv~:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The appellant, Whitmore Oxygen Company, is a
local manufacturing company engaged in the manufacture and ;sale of oxygen, ace'tylene and other bottled
gases (Tr. 32). The Linde Air Products Company is an
Ohio corporation, doing business in Utah, and has its
manufacturing plant :at Speedway, Indiana (Tr. 32, 36).
The two companies are -competitors in the local market.
On Ap.ril 18, 1941, the companies entered into a
written contract (Tr. 36-39), under the terms of which
the Linde Company agreed to sell and the Whitmore
Company agreed to buy a quantity of acetylene cylinders
at an agreed price of $34,600.00. Payment was to be
made by the Whitmore Company in monthly instalments,
beginning thirty (30) days after delivery, and title to
the cylinders was to remain in the Linde Company until
the entire purchase price was paid (Tr. 38). The purchase price was set as being an amount certain per
cylinder, f. o. b. Speedway, Indiana (Tr. 36), and the
contract and record is silent as to the place of delivery
and freight coS't.
The contract was fully performed by the parties.
Linde made delivery of the cylinders in the Fall of 1941,
\Vhitmore made his first monthly payment on Deeemher
1, 1941 (Tr. 37) and paid the balance in full on March
30, 1943, at which time title to the cylinders passed

Wl-

equivocally to. the Whitmore Company (Tr. 33, 37). On
November 21, 1947 (Tr. 1), nearly six years after delivery of the cylinders, and more than four yeaTs after
title to the cylinders passed to the Whitmore Cmnpany.
the Tax Commission made the deficiency Use rrax af'sess-

2
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m~n t

romplained of in thes~ proceedings.
During the entire period involved, that is, fron1
January 1, 1~)41 to the date of the deficiency assessment
in 1947, the "l1itmore Company had filed with the Tax
Con1mission ~Yery two months the commission's Form
71 (Tr. 34), which form is designated by the Tax Com:mlssion as a '•Sales Tax and Use Tax Return" (Tr. 35).
Earh return "~as rertified to by the company in the following language as required by the Tax Commission :
(Tr. 35)
'·I HEREBY CERTIFY, That I have examined this return and that the statements made
and the figures shown herein and in any accompanying schedules are to the best of my knowledge
and belief a ·true and complete return, made in
good faith for the period stated, pursuant to the
Emerg·ency Revenue Act of 1933, as amended,
and the Use Tax Act of 1937 and regulations
issued under authority of both acts.
Whitmore Oxygen Co.
X arne of business or taxpayer
C. A. Pingree
Agent, or officer if corporation,
trustee, etc.
Asst. .Mgr.
"
Title
The \Vhitmore Ox~,gen Company has paid to the
Tax Commission at two month intervals during all the
period from 1941 to 1947, the total amount of Sales Tax
and Use Tax shown to be due upon line eleven ( 11) of
the various returns (Tr. 34). Notwithstanding these
faet:-;, stipulated to be true as they are, the Tax ComJIIi.'i·~·irm found tlwt thf 'Whitm,orc ().rygen Comrm11y had
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never filed a Use Tax Return at any time between J amuary 1, 1941 and December 31, 1946 (Finding No. 2, Tr.
47).

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. The Tax Commission erred in its finding ''That
~the taxpayer filed no Use Tax Returns during the period
January 1, 1941 to December 31, 1946. '' (Finding No. 2,
Tr. 47).
2. The Tax Commission erred in failing to find
that the deficiency Use Tax assessment was barred by
the provisions of Title 104-2-24.10, Utah Code Annotated
1943.
3. The Tax Commission erred in failing to find
that the deficiency Use Tax assessment was barred by
the provisions of Title 104-2-30, Utah Code Annotatell
1943.
4. The Tax Commission erred in failing to find that
the proposed deficiency was barred by the provisions of
Title 80-15-8.
5. The Tax Commission erred in failing to find that
the sale in question was specifically exempt from taxation by virtue of the provisions of Title 80-16-4 ( cl).
6. The Tax Commission erred in finding that the
sale was consummated in the State of Indiana.
7. The Tax Commission erred in its finding that
the sale in question was one in interstate commerce.
8. The Tax Commission erred in concluding that
the taxpayer is liable to the Tax Commi~sion for U st·
Tax in the amount of $1246.81, or in any other sum.
9. The Tax Commission erred in its eoncln~~ion Xo
1
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1, in that the Inatters ~set forth therein are contradictory
and incompatible.

QUESTIONS INVOLVED
Two general questions are presented upon this appeal:
1. Does the ta."'{payer 's procedure in filing the Tax
Commission's Form 71 constitute the filing of a Utse Tax
Return Y If answered in the affirmative, it follows, we
submit, that the assessment of the Commission is barred
by each of several statutes of limitation, and no further
question need be considered. If answered in the negative,
additional problems are presented.
2. Is the sale of personal property evidenced by
the "\Yhitmore-Linde contract subject to a tax under the
Use Tax Art '?

STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
In this brief, appellant will present the following
points:
1. The taxpayer has filed with the Tax Commission
every two months, the Commission's Form 71, and the
purported deficiency Use Tax assessment is barred by the
provisions of each of several ~tatutes of limitation.
2. The sale P\-ridenced by the Whitmore-Linde contrart was either:
(a) }fade in the State of Utah ancl, therpfm·P,
subject to Sales Tax rather than lT se Tax, or (b) made
in Indiana and specifically exempt under the proYisions
of the Use Tax Act because subject to the Gross In(•ome Tax Act of Indiana.
5
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ARGUMENT
1. Although the Whitmore Company has coMistently filed with the Tax Commission its Form 71, designa'ted by the Commission as !a "Sales Tax and Use Tax
Return,'' the Commission has ruled that the taxpayer's
failure to completely fill out the form by omitting to
write "0" on certain lines of the form, constitutes a
failure of the taxpayer to file a Use Tax return at all.
The filing of a return is the incident precedent to the
'starting point of the statute of limitations running in
favor of the taxpayer and, consequently, the Commission
has claimed the right to audit for Use Tax without limitation. The Sales Tax audit was only for the period
1944-47 (tr. 32), the three-year period allowed by the
provisions of Title 80-15-8, and the Commission ha~ conceded that Form 71 as filed constitutes a Sales rrax
return regardless of the fact that many blanks relative
to Sal~s Tax, including all of the questions contained on
the back of the form ( tr. 35) are not filled in. \\~ e beliP\'('
the position of the Commission to be both inconsistent
and erroneous.
What good would it do to have had the taxpayPr
write '' 0'' upon each of the lines on the face of the
return~ The net result of the return would have been
the same; the auditing result -would have been the ~alnP:
~the administrative problems would have been the same:
the taxpayer's liability would have been the SallH'. rrll
write "0" in the blanks would have been a useles1s gP~
ture, and it is an ancient maxim that the law does 110l
require a person to do a useless thing.
1
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Th~

intent of the taxpayer to have Form 71 constitute a Use Tax return would not be aided by the addition
of zeros throughout the return. The intent of the taxpayer is clear by his designation on line 11 of the return
"·here he states the total amount of Sales and Use Tax
due, and is clin1axed by his formal certification that the
return is true and complete for both Sales and Use Tax.
In Zellerbach Paper Company v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
at 180, 79 L. Ed. at 269, ~the Supreme Court of the United
8tates, speaking through ~[r. Justice Cardoza, In considering the Internal Revenue Act, states:
_''Perfect accuracy or completeness is not
necessary to rescue a return from a nullity if it
purports to be a return, is sworn to as such, and
evidences an honest and genuine endeavor to
satisfy the law.''
Applying this rule to the instant case we have no
hesitancy in maintaining that Form 71 as filed every two
Inonths by the Whitmore Company is not a nullity relative to U ~e Tax. The form is furnished by the Tax Comm~ssion, and that hody is solely responsible for its form.
It is labeled a "Sales and Use Tax Return," is the
standard one furnished taxpayers such as the Whitmore
Company, and is consistently referred to as a ''return''
in the singular. Had the T·ax Commission considered or
t1P:..:ired the form to be othenYise than a return for bqth
tuxt~.~. tlw:v could have easily changed the wording to so
indicate. Had the Tax Cummission thought it necessan·
to have the taxpayer fill the form with zero~ where applicable, they could have so indicated. The words "if
none, Ro indicate" are common instructions on Inany
7
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forms. But the Commission chose Form 71 and the
wording thereof, and the taxpayers have a right to rely
on the form's appearance and apparent purpose, that is,
that it i:s a ''Sales and Use Tax Return.'' And when a
taxpayer certifies that the form cons,titutes a true and
complete return for both taxes, his duty is fulfilled. He
has filed a return for both taxes.
The Sales Tax and Use Tax are complimentary
taxes ·so related one with the other that to effectuate
the general purpose of the taxes, this court has held that
certain exemptions. found in the Sales Tax Act, but not
in the Use A0t, apply nevertheless to the Use Tax Act.
Union Portland Cement Company v. Tax Commission, ______ Utah ______ , 176 P. 2d 879.
The two taxes, though written separately for necessit~:,
are intended to provide a comprehensive taxing s~·stem
upon the use, storage and consumption of personal property in this state. See Douglas Aircraft ComJW11JJ v .
.Johnson, 13 Cal. 2d 545, 90 P. 2d 572.
Now, because the two taxes are so clcrsE,ly n·lated
and are in fact just one comprehensive taxing systeu1,
the taxpayer cannot be called upon to distinguish carefully between each tax separately. This is particularly
evident in the instant case as will subsequently appPar in
ou.r discussion as to which tax is applicable, if any, to
the sale involved in this case. The close and extrPmely
technical distinction between the application of HlP two
taxes is totally beyond the average taxpayer's knowledg"
and in many cases will be doubtful, even should the taxpayer seek the most expert of advirP. This faet hn~

8
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been recognized by the Tax Conunission in choowsing the
form of Form 71, and is further recognized in its Regulation No. 1, wherein it is stated:
''. . . The two taxes are compensating taxes,
one supplementing the other, but both cannot he
applicable to the same 'transaction. The rate of
each tax is the same and it is, therefore, usually
unnecessary to determine ·which tax is technically
applicable."
Because of these matters, taxpayers cannot and are
not required to distinguish between the taxes, and it is
the wise and proper thing to have the taxpayers file one
return for the two taxes. But having chosen the fonn
and indicating that it is a return for both taxes, we
submit the Tax Commission cannot now say that a taxpayer is not, as "Jir. Justice Cardoza says, "making a
genuine endeavor to satisfy the law," when the taxpayer
certifies that the return is for both taxes, but neglects
to fill in some useles~ zeros in some lines of the form.
1

\Ye believe that the \Vhitmore Company has clearly
met every test as laid down by Mr. Justice Cardoza.
Form 71 purports to be a Use Tax return. It is sworn
to a~ such hy the Whitmore Company and constitutes an
honest and geniune endeavor to satisfy a moist complicated and hard-to-distinguish system of taxation. The
:came method of filing has been used by the \Yhitmore
Company since the effective date of the Use Tax in 1937,
without prior complaint or criticism. A multitude of
other taxpayers endeaYnring to satisfy the la,,~ and the
requirements of the Tax Commission havr undoubted!~,
filed the ::arne r'orm in the samP mamwr.
9
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2. As we have pointed out, if the court concludel5
that the Whitmore Company has made ''an honest and
genuine endeavor to satisfy the law'' in the filing of
Form 71, no consideration need be given to other matters
presened in this appeal; however, should the court reach
a contrary conclusion, the question of which tax, sales
or use, if either, is applicable to the Whitmore-Linde
'transaction must be considered. As the court pointed out
at Union Portland Cement Company v. State. Tax Cornmission, ______ Utah ...... , 170 P. 2d 164 (original opinion),
ordinarily the situs of a sale is where the act is performed or the event occurs which operates to vest title
in the buyer. Under the expre,ss terms of the WhitmoreLinde contract (tr. 38), title was retained in the Linde
Company until the purchase price was paid. Cow;<·quently, the actual passing of title to the tanks passed
,,-hile the goods were in Whitmore's possession in Utah
and title passed in Utah. The designation in the eontrart
(tr. 36) of a purchase price, f.o.b. Speedwa~,, Indiana,
did in no way change that fact. A sale contract expressly
providing that title to property shall remain in the ~PH<:'l'
until the property is paid for is not affected by a prOYIsion to deliver f.o.h. point ~of shipment, and title remain~
in the seller regardless of deliYel')'.
Colles v. Lake Cities Electric Company, 22 Indiana Appeals 86, 53 N. E. 256.
Petersburg Firebrick Company v. Ameriean Chl~'
Company, 89 Ohio 365, 106 )J_ E. 33.
If the Sales Tax Act is applicable, the taxable ineident was not the passage of title, but the transfer of
possession due to the specific rnoYi~ions of Title 80-1;)-~

10
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(b). '\vhich provides in part:
'• ~-\ transaction ·whereby the possession of
property is transferred, but the seller retains the
title as security for the payment of the price shall
be deemed a ,.sale.''
rrhe Use Tax Aet has a comparable provision relating to the definition of "purchase" (Title 80-16-2 (c)),
but the provision here can affect only the tax basis and
not the tax incident as the tax incident, regardless of
"-here or "-hen title or possession pa~ses, is the use,
storage or consumption of property in Utah.
\Yhere, then, did the possession of the goods pass~
The record is silent as to where and when the Whitmore
Company took possession of the goods and as to payment
of freight charges from Indiana to Utah. The silence of
the record in this regard is praetical evidence of the
harshness of an administrative effort to tax a sevenyear-old transaction, and practical evidence of the fairness of statutes of limitation for the protection of taxpayers making conscientious effortis to comply with complicated tax requirements. At this late date neither
\Yhitmore nor Linde has available records relating to
the transfer of possession of the tanks nor to the payment
of freight charges nor reimbursements for such charges,
if any there be. However, some of the contract provisions
an. helpful in determining the intent of the parties as
to whPther the transaction was to be considered an
Incljana or a Utah sale.
Paragraph eight of the contract (tr. 39) provides
that the validity, interpn~tation and performance of the
('cntnwt slwuld be governed hy the law of Utah. rrlw
11
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place of performance of a contract is the state where
the promise is to be performed.
Beale Conflict of Laws, Vol. II, P.age 1259.
This contract was made in Utah, as the acceptance
was made by Whitmore in Sal~t Lake City (tr. 33), which
act wa.s the final act necessary to make the cont:r~act
binding (tr. 39), by the express provisions of the contract. In the absence of contrary agreements or circumstances when no place of performance is fixed by a contract, it will be presumed that the contract is to be
performed where made.
Lawson v. Tripp, 34 U·tah 28, 95 P. 520.
This is especially true, and the presumption is stronger
where the contract, as this one does, provides expressly
that designated portions shall be performed at the plarP
of contracting.
Burr v. 'Western States Life of California, 296 P.
273.
The contract also contains a provision (Paragraph
2, tr. 38) that Whitmore would pay on demand to Linde
any Sales, Use or other excise tax for which Linde might
be liable. If this transaction was intended by the partiPs
to be a U~tah sale, the contract provision has rsome signifi-·
cance for Linde would be liable for a sales tax. If, hov\'ever, the sale was intended as an Indiana sale, as the
Tax Commission contends, and one in interstat<> eommerce, Linde could have no liability and the eontrad
provision is meaningless. A case clearly in point and
nearly identical in fact ~s found in Commonwealtl1 of
Pennsylvania v. Wiloil Corporation, 316 Pa. 33, 17R A tl.

12
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404, 101 A. L. R. 287'. In that case the Wiloil Corporation,
a Pennsylvania company, sold to cert~ain vendees located
also in Pennsylvania, quantities of gasoline at a price
f. o. b. \Yihnington, Delaware, with the specifi·c provision
that the vendees would pay to the vendors the Pennsylyania gasoline tax in ~addition to the amount set as the
purchase price. In a suit by the State of Pen111sylvania
to recover the gasoline tax, the Wiloil Company defended
upon the al;sertion that title to the gasoline passed to the
vendee at vVilmington and that as a consequence it
wasn't 'a Pennsylvania sale. The court rejected that
theory, stating:
'• The first position assumed by appellant is
that the title to the gasoline passed :to the purchasers at \Yihnington, Del., and that they were
the importers under the terms of the act and
alone liable for the tax. The second position taken
is that, if the title did not pass at Wilmington,
deliYeries were made to the purchasers in Pennsylvania in tank cars, the original packages, that
the shipments were at all times in interstate commerce and the charging of the tax to the seller is
illegal, as it imposes a burden upon such commerce, and that, if that be the intent of the act,
it is unconstituional.
"Taking up the fir~t position, vve find that the
Sa1P.s Act of l\fay 19, 1915, P. L. 543, Para. 18,
69 PS Para-142, recognizes ~that the intention of
the buyPr and the seller determines the time of
the pa.~sage of title. For the purpose of ascertaining their intention, the act says regard shall
lw had to the terms of the contract, the conduct
of the parties, usages of trade, and the ci reums!n nee~ of the case.
"\Ve start with the fad that the sale wa-s
1

13
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actually made in Pennsylvania. The contention
of appellant arises out of the circumstance that
the price was fixed f. o. b. Wilmington. This, however, does not necessarily mean that title passed
there; particularly is this so in view of the in~tention of the parties evidenced by the provision
in their contract that the vendees !should pay the
tax to the vendors. If the parties contemplated
that the ti tle passed at Wilmington, outside Pennsylvania, :and the gasoline there belonged to the
purchasers, it is difficult to un~erstand how the
seller could have regarded its.elf as in any way
liable for a Pennsylvania tax. As we view. it, the
provision in the contract that the gasoline wa!s to
be f. o. b. Wilmington was not intended to designate the place of delivery, but to fix the full price
to be paid. This is shown by plaintiff's invoie<-~
offered in evidence, which, after setting forth the
sale, contains the following: 'Price 5lj2 c gal. f. o. h.
Wilmington, Del. plus 3c tax'.''
We submit, therefore, that the Whitmore-Linde
transaction was a sale in Utah subject to the Sala-; rrax
and improperly assessed by the Tax Commis~ion as a
Use Tax. As the Com·mission states in its Sales and LT ~P
Tax Regulation No. 1, "if the sale is made in Utah the
Bales Tax applies. If the sale is made elsevdwre, the
Use Tax applies."
1

3. Even assuming, however, that the 1sale was an
Indiana sale as found by the Commission in its Conchlsion No. 1 (tr. 47), the purported Use Tax asP-<'ssment
was improper. Title 80-16-4 (d) provides an exemption
upon ''property the gross receipts from the sale, di1stribution or use of which are now subject to a sale or <>xeisP
tax under the laws of the state or of some other ~ ta1 <' of
14
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the United ~tnh's. '•
If, as stated by the Commission's finding (tr. 47),
.. the sale \Yals consummated in the s'tate of Indiana," it
follows that the sale was subject to the Indiana Gross
Income Tax ) •. ct of 1933, which act is in effect a general
sales tax aet. 'Ye understand that the Tax Commission
has long· interpreted the words ''subject to'' as found
in Title 80-16-4 (d) as meaning ''subject to and actually
paid.'' In other -vvordls, the T·ax Commission insiS'ts that
a foreign sales tax be actually paid to a sister state in
addition to the transaction being subject to the sales tax
of a sister state. 'Vith this interpretation we have no
s~~mpathy or patience. A misinterpretation of 'a statute,
no matter how long continued by an administrative body,
gin~'s no regularity to the interpretation.

,,~hen

Utah Concrete Products v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P. 2d 408.
the Utah Legislature used the words "subject to,"

the intent of the law was and is clear, and an administrati,~e

body has no power to limit the exemption in such

broad fashion by reading in additional limitations. Although ,,.e have made no search of the Indiana law, the
probability is tha;t there is ample authority that a transaction such as the Whitmore-Linde sale is not taxable
in Indiana. This is true, we believe, because the Indiana
authoriti~s

could not successfully claim that the sale was

''consummated in Indiana.'' However, any sale actually
''consummated in Indiana'' would be subject to thPir
Gro:-::-: Income

r:I~ax

Act.
15
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CONCLUSION
We submit that the assessment of the Tax Commission is erroneous 'and unlawful from any approach made
to the problem. We think it dear that the Whitmore
Company has filed 1a Use Tax Return every 1two months
since the Use Tax Act became effective, and that any
purported asse'ssment upon a transaction occurring in
1941 is barred by each of the following statutory provisions:
''Title 104-2-24.10.
An action for a liability created by the statutes
of this s~tate, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the la~ of this state, except where
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the :statutes of this state, shall bt~
commenced within ~three years.''
''Title 104-2-30.
An action for relief not otherwise provided for
must be commenced within four years after the
cause of action shall have accrued.''
We submit further that the assessment was made
by the Tax Commission erroneously

~and

unlawfully

under the Use Tax Act when such act was not applicable,
and upon a sale made in the state of Utah and subject
to the Utah Sales Tax. In this regard i't is admitted, we
think, that had the Tax Commission made the assessment
under the Sales Tax Act, the

asse~sment

would have

been barred by the Statutes of LimHations above set
forth, and specifically barred, in addition, by the provi'sions of Title 80-15-8.
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In conclusion we submit that even if Whitmore had
filed no returns ·and if the Tax Commission had been
correct in their finding that the s~ale was ''consummated
in the state of Indiana,'' !still the assessment would have
been unlawful and erroneous because the transaction, if
consummated in Indiana, would have been subject to the
Indiana Sales Tax and specifically exempt from U~tah
taxation under the provisions of Title 80-16-4 (d).
The order of the Tax Commission making the deficiency assessment against the Whitmore Company
should be reversed and the alsseS'sment held to be invalid.
Respectfully submitted,

DAVID T. LEWIS,
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Received a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
this -------------------- day of April, 1948.

Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents
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